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Section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure makes
purchase-money deeds of trust in California "nonrecourse" by
prohibiting any deficiency judgment following foreclosure. In
Spangler v. Memel, the California Supreme Court created an exception to the antideficiency rule of section 580b where the seller
subordinated the buyer's purchase-money deed of trust to a construction loan deed of trust which was subsequently foreclosed,
leaving the seller without security. An analysis of Spangler suggests that it was a misconceived attempt to protect sellers as a
"class"from certain risks of real estate development, even though
sellers of developable property often reap a benefit in higher prices
by sharing in such risk. The decision was based on a number of
fictions and rationalizations that are inconsistent with the real
world of commercial real estate transactions. Cases which have
followed and extended Spangler have continued to rely on poorly
analyzed statements in the case and have created confusion and
unpredictablity in the law relating to purchase-money deeds of
trust. More principled and predictable decisions would be based
on the negotiated agreements of the parties, including contractual
waivers of section 580b protection when they are agreed to.
INTRODUCTION

Every practitioner and student of the law has seen examples of

court-created exceptions to statutory rules. Courts sometimes create
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exceptions to statutes based on the judges' perceptions of the requirements of justice in particular circumstances. Jurisprudentially
this can be tricky business, especially when the statute is one that
has widespread application in commercial transactions and the exception is based on poorly defined or untestable theories. This Article
explores the pitfalls of judicial creation of one such exception to a
clear statutory rule of California law regarding financing of real estate purchase and sale transactions.
Section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure (580b) establishes the statutory rule that the buyer of real property in California who pays part of the purchase price with a note to the seller
secured by a deed of trust or mortgage on the property purchased is
not personally liable on the note. The seller must look solely to the
real property security for enforcement of the obligation by foreclosure, and no deficiency judgment is permitted. The celebrated collapses of the Denver, Dallas, and Phoenix real estate markets during
the mid-1980s, and recent sharp declines in California real property
values emphasize the significance of 580b's nonrecourse rule. In
Spangler v. Memel,' the California Supreme Court created an exception to the rule of 580b by holding that 580b does not protect the
purchaser from suit for a deficiency judgment where the seller, pursuant to the sale agreement, subordinates the lien of the seller's
purchase-money deed of trust to a construction loan obtained by the
buyer for commercial development of the property.2
A growing number of appellate court decisions have followed and
considerably expanded Spangler. These include Long v. Superior
Court (Rickert),3 Roffinella v. Sherinian,4 Ziegler v. Barnes,' and
others.
It is the thesis of this Article that Spangler and its progeny are
based on fictions and represent unwarranted judicial protectionism.
The Spangler doctrine results in unpredictable and potentially unjust
consequences in the real world of real estate transactions. Courts
could balance the risks of real property purchase transactions more
consistently with the expectations of the parties by respecting the
plain language of 580b and the parties' own negotiated agreements
(including contractual waivers of 580b), than through a poorly conceived judicial exception to a clear statutory rule. It is not the purpose of this Article to argue whether or not the nonrecourse rule of

1.
2.
3.
(1985).
4.
5.

Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972).
Id. at 615, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
Long v. Superior Court (Rickert), 170 Cal. App. 3d 499, 216 Cal. Rptr. 337
Roffinella v. Sherinian, 179 Cal. App. 3d 230, 224 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1986).
Ziegler v. Barnes, 200 Cal. App. 3d 224, 246 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1988).
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580b is itself good policy. 6 However, nonrecourse for secured
purchase-money obligations is the existing statutory rule of California. As such, the courts should decide cases in a way that will allow

transacting parties to predict the consequences of their agreements
with reasonable accuracy when they negotiate in light of that statutory rule.
BACKGROUND

Section 580b and Its Application Prior To Spangler: The Search
for Elusive Purposes
Before turning to Spangler itself, it is necessary to review some

earlier guidepost decisions that interpreted the meaning and effects
of 580b.
Currently, 580b provides:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after a sale of real property or
an estate for years therein for failure of the purchaser to complete his or
her contract of sale, or under a deed of trust or mortgage given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of that real
property ....

Section 580b was first enacted in 1933.8 It was part of a spate of
legislation arising from the collapse of real estate values during the

Great Depression.9 Unfortunately, there is virtually no legislative
history to aid in interpretation of the statute.

A major question arising from the language of the statute is
whether the bar against personal liability arises only if the

seller/beneficiary forecloses under the purchase-money deed of trust,
or whether it is also operative after foreclosure by the holder of a

lien senior to that of the seller. The latter situation typically arises
when a property is sold and the seller takes back a second deed of

trust behind a third-party lender. The Supreme Court answered this
key question in Brown v. Jensen.10

In Brown, the plaintiff seller took back a note secured by a second
6. It is certainly not universal in the United States. Many other states allow deficiency judgments on purchase-money notes after foreclosure. Indeed, the general rule is
personal liability for deficiency. See, e.g., 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 777 (1949 & Supp.
1993). The question is likely to be debated extensively in response to the proposed major
reform of California's foreclosure laws. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1993).
8. 1933 Cal. Stat. 642.
9. See generally, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, CaliforniaLegislation CurbingDeficiency
Judgments, 48 CAL. L. REV. 705 (1960) (discussing the background of 580b).
10. Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).

deed of trust on the sold property. The buyer placed a first deed of
trust in favor of Glendale Federal Savings and Loan ahead of the
seller's encumbrance at the closing, the proceeds of which presumably were paid to the seller. Glendale Federal foreclosed after the
buyer defaulted under its note. Plaintiff seller did not attempt to buy
the property at the foreclosure sale to protect her second deed of
trust, but afterwards sued on the purchase-money note and obtained

a judgment against the buyer.
The buyer pleaded 580b as a bar to the action. The trial court
apparently determined that since there had been no "sale" by the
seller under her deed of trust, the action by the seller was not one for
a "deficiency" and 580b therefore did not apply. The Supreme Court
examined the several antideficiency sections, 580a, 580b, and 580d,11
11. Section 580a of the California Code of Civil Procedure attempts to assure that
the debtor defendant in an action for a deficiency judgment will receive credit for the fair
value of the foreclosed property. It provides,
Whenever a money judgment is sought for the balance due upon an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale
upon real property or any interest therein was given as security, following the
exercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust or mortgage, the plaintiff
shall set forth in his or her complaint the entire amount of the indebtedness
which was secured by the deed of trust or mortgage at the time of sale, the
amount for which the real property or interest therein was sold and the fair
market value thereof at the date of sale and the date of that sale. Upon the
application of either party made at least 10 days before the time of trial the
court shall, and upon its own motion the court at any time may, appoint one of
the probate referees provided for by law to appraise the property of the interest
therein sold as of the time of sale. The referee shall file his or her appraisal
with the clerk and that appraisal shall be admissible in evidence. The referee
shall take and subscribe an oath to be attached to the appraisal that he or she
has truly, honestly and impartially appraised the property to the best of his or
her knowledge and ability. Any referee so appointed may be called and examined as a witness by any party or by the court itself. The court must fix the
compensation of the referee in an amount as determined by the court to be
reasonable, but those fees shall not exceed similar fees for similar services in
the community where the services are rendered, which may be taxed and allowed in like manner as other costs. Before rendering any judgment the court
shall find the fair market value of the real property, or interest therein sold, at
the time of sale. The court may render judgment for not more than the amount
by which the entire amount of the indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeded the fair market value of the real property or interest therein sold at the
time of sale with interest thereon from the date of the sale; provided, however,
that in no event shall the amount of the judgment, exclusive of interest after
the date of sale, exceed the difference between the amount for which the property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by the deed of
trust or mortgage. Any such action must be brought within three months of the
time of sale under the deed of trust or mortgage. No judgment shall be rendered in any such action until the real property or interest therein has first
been sold pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage, unless the
real property or interest therein has become valueless.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1993). Section 580d prohibits a deficiency
judgment whenever a mortgage or deed of trust on real property is foreclosed under a
power of sale, i.e., nonjudicial foreclosure. Section 580d provides,
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by deed
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and concluded:
These provisions indicate a considered course on the part of the legislature
to limit strictly the right to recover deficiency judgments, that is, to recover
on the debt more than the value of the security. Next comes section 580b,
here involved, which deals with a special type of security transaction, a
trust deed given to secure to the vendor of property the purchase price
agreed to be paid by the vendee. That section is necessarily intended to
provide a protection for the trustor because if it were intended to cover only
the situation where there has been an actual sale of the security under the
power of sale in the trust deed, it would be superfluous. Section 580d covers
situation in all trust deeds, whether purchase-money or
precisely that
2
otherwise.1

The court then made a curious statement which has perplexed
subsequent courts and commentators and created one of the unfortunate fictions underlying Spangler. The Brown court prognosticated
that "[t]he one taking such a trust deed [i.e., securing a note for
part of the purchase price] knows the value of his security and assumes the risk that it may become inadequate."' 13 The second half of
the statement (about assuming the risk of inadequacy) is nothing but
a tautological restatement of the rule of 580b itself. The unanalyzed
and unsupported fiction resides in the first part of the statement, i.e.,
that sellers somehow have superior knowledge of "the value of [the]
security." This troublesome fiction of the seller's presumed greater
knowledge will be discussed further below; however at this point it
should be noted that it was not at all essential or even very useful to
the decision.
The court went on to conclude that under 580b, the security alone
can be looked to by the seller, and if the security is lost through
foreclosure of a senior lien, the seller has no recourse against the
buyer. "The section states that in no event shall there be a deficiency
judgment, that is, whether there is a sale under the power of sale or
sale under foreclosure, or no sale because the security has become
of trust or mortgage upon real property or an estate for years therein hereafter
executed in any case in which the real property or estate for years therein has
been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in the

mortgage or deed of trust.
This section does not apply to any deed of trust, mortgage or other lien given to
secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or
permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of Corporations, or which is made
by a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Act (Part 1 (commencing with
Section 201) of Division I of the Public Utilities Code).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West Supp. 1993).
12. Brown, 41 Cal. 2d at 197, 259 P.2d at 426-27 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 197, 259 P.2d at 427.

valueless or is exhausted." 14 Thus, the decision in Brown stands on a
plain reading of the actual words of the statute, specifically the
words "in any event." 15 It does not rest on revelation of hidden statutory purpose or theories of the relative knowledge or equities of buyers and sellers.
Except for Spangler and the line of subordination cases trailing in
its muddy wake, Brown's literal reading of 580b has been consistently followed. 6
The next major development after Brown in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of 580b was Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino.17 Roseleaf
presented an unusual and compelling fact situation. The defendant
bought a hotel from plaintiff seller. The purchase price included several promissory notes, one of which was secured by the hotel property, while the others were secured by other properties owned by the
buyer, all of which were subject to senior liens in favor of third parties. The buyer defaulted on the notes to the seller secured by the
other properties but not on the note secured by the hotel property.
The senior lien holders on the other properties foreclosed, leaving the
plaintiff seller's notes on those properties unsecured.
The seller sued on the notes that had been secured by the foreclosed properties, and the buyer asserted the defense of 580b. Thus,
the buyer seeking protection of 580b still had ownership of the property he had purchased from the plaintiff, while the plaintiff held only
paper, the security for which had been lost because of the buyer's
default on obligations to other lenders secured by property other
than the purchased property. Application of 580b would have meant
the buyer retained the property without paying the contract
purchase price.
The trial court readily perceived the unfairness of allowing the
14. Id. at 198, 259 P.2d at 427.
15. But see City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991), a
recent Utah Supreme Court decision in which it was held that Utah's "one form of
action" rule, equivalent to section 726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, did not
bar a sold-out junior lienor (not purchase-money) from suing the borrower directly on
the note. The court also held that Utah's fair value limitations, equivalent to section 580a
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, did not apply to limit the amount recoverable
by the sold-out junior creditor.
16. See, e.g., Raub v. Lee, 181 Cal. App. 2d 529, 5 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1960); Lucky
Investments, Inc. v. Adams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 462, 7 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1960); Jackson v.
Taylor, 272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 180 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1969); and Shepard v. Robinson, 128
Cal. App. 3d 615, 180 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981). See also Clayton Development Co. v.
Falvey, 206 Cal. App. 3d 438, 253 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1988) (holding that 580b applied to
bar a seller's suit against the buyer after foreclosure by the first trust deed holder where
the seller's second was an equitable mortgage resulting from an erroneously recorded
deed of trust.) In Falvey, the clear intention of the parties to create a secured purchasemoney obligation was honored by the court in spite of a legal description error that prevented the deed of trust from appearing in the subsequent chain of title.
17. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
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buyer to keep the property yet remain protected from a judgment for
the unpaid portion of the price. Hence, the trial court awarded judgment for the seller. The Supreme Court affirmed. The court, however, had to struggle a bit with the plain language of 580b which did
not then specifically refer to sale under a deed of trust on the purchased property. At that time 580b just referred to sale of real property under a deed of trust or mortgage to "secure payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property."' 8 A 1989 amendment changed it to read "the purchase price of that real property,"
i.e., the property sold under the mortgage or deed of trust. 19

To get around the slight vagueness of wording, the Roseleaf court
resorted to creation of a second unfortunate fiction, adding to the
confusion of Brown's "superior knowledge of the seller" fiction.
Without stating how it was apparent and without defining what was
a "standard" transaction, the court said that "580b was apparently
drafted in contemplation of the standardpurchase money mortgage
transaction, in which the vendor of real property retains an interest
in the land sold to secure payment of part of the purchase price." 20
The court was not able to cite any legislative history or other basis
for the notion that 580b was directed only to "standard" transactions.2 Roseleafs fiction of a "standard" purchase-money deed of
trust transaction, as opposed to "variations," like Brown's presumption of the seller's superior knowledge of value of the security, is the
second major fiction underlying Spangler and the continued confusion in applying 580b.
Having created the fiction of the "standard" transaction, the
Roseleaf court then went on a search for the elusive "purpose" of
580b to complete its rationale for the decision, stating that 580b applies to "[v] ariations on the standard" only if the transactions "come
18. Id. at 41 n.4, 378 P.2d at 100 n.4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.4.
19. 1989 Cal. Stat. 698 § 12.
20. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (emphasis
added).
21. It must also be noted that the description of the "standard purchase money
mortgage transaction" (one in which the seller retains a security interest in the property
sold to secure payment of part of the purchase price) actually included the Roseleaf type
transaction since in Roseleafpart of the purchase price was secured by a note and deed
of trust on the hotel. Indeed, the court's general description of the "standard" transaction
includes virtually all purchase-money mortgage transactions. Id. The opinion could have
stopped at this point by saying that "standard" means the mortgage or deed of trust is on
the property sold, thus interpreting the then existing language of 580b to include the
missing "that" which was added in 1989 by the legislature. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Alas, the Court apparently felt the need to go on to look for "purpose"
instead of being satisfied with mere meaning.

'
within the purpose of that section. "22
After considering and rejecting several previously suggested "purposes" (including the Brown court's suggestion that one taking a
purchase-money trust deed "knows the value of his security and assumes the risk"), the court settled on two. First, the court theorized
that by placing the risk of inadequate security on the seller, sellers
would be "discouraged from overvaluing" their property in sales
transactions; this in turn was presumed to discourage "precarious
land promotion schemes. 23 Second, the court divined that 580b is
intended to prevent aggravation of the economic downturn that
would result from declines in property values in a general or local
depression if defaulting buyers were burdened with large personal
liabilities in addition to loss of their property through foreclosure.
The court said, "Section 580b thus serves as a stabilizing factor in
land sales."24
Neither of these heady economic "purposes" applied to the facts
of Roseleaf. The buyer still held the property and there was no indication that the property had been overvalued or that there was a
depression in the area. The court apparently decided that the
Roseleaf-Chierighino transaction was not "standard" because the
notes being sued on were secured by property other than the property sold. Because the "purposes" of 580b were unrelated to the
facts and the transaction was not "standard," the court concluded
that Roseleafs cause of action was not barred by 580b.
The first of the two "purposes" of 580b suggested by the court is
highly doubtful. Human nature suggests that a seller will always try
to get the highest price possible even if partly on paper, and a buyer
not concerned with personal liability for failure to pay a purchasemoney note is certainly not discouraged by the statute from offering
a greater price. The seller's risk of not being paid where he takes a
second trust deed depends more on the risk of foreclosure of the first
than it depends on the size of the second. While the loan to value
ratio of total debt secured by the property is certainly one factor
affecting that risk, it is not the only one, and may be less significant
than other factors such as cash flow of the property, the buyer/borrower's income and other assets, the relative size of the loans in comparison to each other, and perceived trends in real estate values.
Thus, 580b is unlikely to discourage overvaluation, and may in fact
promote overvaluation in an otherwise hot market because buyers

22. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (emphasis
added).
23. Id. at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (citing Brainerd Currie &
Mark S. Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflictof-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE L.J. 1, 33-34, 39-40).
24. Id.
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can increase their offers on paper without fear of personal liability.
The macroeconomic effects proposed in Roseleaf as the second "purpose" of 580b are equally doubtful. It is not at all clear what empirical data could be used to demonstrate any effect of 580b in
preventing "aggravation of [economic] downturn" 2 5 or contributing
to economic stabilization.
In spite of the fact that the Roseleaf court rested its decision on
the weak pillars of fictional "standard" transactions and speculative
micro and macroeconomic "purposes," one can hardly argue convincingly with the result. Whatever the purpose or purposes behind
580b, it would have been unconscionable to permit the defendant to
retain the property yet escape paying the agreed contract price for
it.26 It is clear from the plain language of 580b that it protects individual buyers from the economic calamity of loss of the purchased
property through foreclosure followed by exposure to personal liability for a deficiency judgment. If the court in Roseleaf had eschewed
speculation on broad macroeconomic "purposes" and focused on this
obviously intended result, it could have clarified the meaning of 580b
without clouding the discussion with speculative and untestable notions of discouragement of overvaluation and economic stabilization.
The legislature could not have meant for a defaulting purchaser to
be free to keep the property and not pay the agreed price. Therefore,
it would have been sufficient for the court simply to decide that 580b
could not be asserted as a defense to a suit for the purchase price
because the buyer still owned the property, a meaning obviously ratified by the above-mentioned 1989 amendment to 580b.
Shortly after the Roseleaf decision, Professor John Hetland (who
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Roseleaj) published an article (Hetland I),217 in which he criticized Brown as an
unwarranted extension of 580b. Hetland argued that Brown was inconsistent with the purposes and intent of the statutory framework of
sections 726, 580a, 580b, and 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Professor Hetland extravagantly praised Justice Traynor's decision
25. Id.
26. This obvious theme of Roseleaf was played again in Goodyear v. Mack, 159
Cal. App. 3d 654, 205 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1984), where some time after the sale, the original purchase-money deed of trust on the property sold was reconveyed and replaced with
a note and junior deed of trust on other property belonging to the buyer. Section 580b
did not bar suit on the substituted note after foreclosure of a senior lien on the substituted security property, where the buyer still owned the property purchased from the
plaintiff, freed of the purchase-money lien by the substitution of collateral.
27. John R. Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California- A New Judicial Approach, 51 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1963) [hereinafter Hetland I].

in Roseleaf as bringing consistency to analysis of those statutes. Reviewing Roseleafs speculations about the purposes of 580b, Professor Hetland asserted that Roseleaf "stripped" Brown's fiction of the
superior knowledge of the seller on which the Brown court based extension of 580b to sold-out junior liens. "Brown should be dead," he
said.28 In view of Spangler, however, and other 580b decisions since,
it is clear that Professor Hetland was mistaken in announcing
Brown's demise.
In a subsequent article (Hetland II),29 Professor Hetland reaffirmed the assertion that Brown was all but overruled by Roseleaf.
He suggested that Roseleaf allowed important predictions to be
made with confidence about the future direction of decisions in the
antideficiency area. Professor Hetland then made two predictions
relevant to the thesis of this Article. First, gazing into a crystal ball
with Roseleaf-colored glasses, Professor Hetland again (wrongly)
predicted that Brown was likely to be overruled, and soon. Second,
he predicted, indeed even strongly urged, the creation of the rule of
Spangler.3°
Hetland's arguments that Brown unjustifiably extended 580b and
that Roseleaf analytically overruled Brown are both based on comparison and criticism of the discussions of the purposes of 580b in
the two cases. In Hetland I, for example, Hetland cogently attacks
the Roseleaf postulation that prevention of overvaluation is an underlying purpose of 580b. Hetland is less successful, however, in attacking the notion that a purpose of 580b is to avoid aggravation of
declines in property values by protecting buyers from the additional
loss of a personal judgment for 'the unpaid note after foreclosure. To
the extent this "purpose" is restated simply as protection of individual buyers from increased loss, Brown's holding clearly serves it,
since the aggravation of the buyer's loss by a deficiency judgment
after foreclosure is the same regardless of whether it is the seller or a
senior lien holder who forecloses.
In his analysis attacking Brown, Hetland gives insufficient attention to the plain language of 580b which, without straining or extending, clearly includes the foreclosure situation involved in Brown.
A suit by the seller for the balance of the buyer's secured purchasemoney note is barred "in any event . . . under a deed of trust, or

mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of
the purchase price of real property. '3 1 Ultimately, Brown should be

28. Id. at 11.
29. John R. Hetland, Real Property and Real PropertySecurity: The Well-Being
of the Law, 53 CAL. L. REv. 151 (1965) [hereinafter Hetland II].
30. Id. at 162.
31. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1993).

[VOL 30: 509, 1993]

CCP Section 580b Revisited
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

interpreted to rest on a literal application of the language of the statute, not on the frail analysis of "purpose" which was and is subject
to criticism.
Ten years after the Brown decision the legislature was presented
with the opportunity to amend the language of the statute. Senate
Bill 950, introduced in the 1963 session, would have deleted the key
words "in any event" from the statute, and so probably would have
compelled a change in the Brown result. The bill did not pass. Similarly, in the 1989 amendment mentioned above the words "in any
event" were retained. 32 Under commonly applied principles of statutory interpretation, it may be presumed that the legislature has
therefore approved Brown's interpretation of 580b, and Brown cannot be considered an extension of the law.
Although Professor Hetland's prediction that Brown would be
overruled turned out to be wrong, he did accurately forecast the result of the Spangler decision. In Hetland II, Professor Hetland argued that the holding of Brown, in conjunction with the provisions of
580a, 580c, and 580d, leaves the individual seller of property as the
only lender who is barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment
against all buyers "including the most likely deficiency judgment
candidate, the property developer."3 Professor Hetland theorized:
"To decide, therefore, whether or not a sold-out junior should be
able to recover a judgment on the note after a senior has taken all of
the security, one has to decide who the buyer 34
and seller are likely to
be and then compare their relative equities."
This remarkable statement appears to suggest that, notwithstanding the expansive language of 580b and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, interpretation of 580b should be based on speculation
as to the likely identity of parties to a transaction, followed by a
balancing of the jurists' sympathies for one class of transactional
parties against another. Without indicating what "equities" should
be considered, Professor Hetland suggests a view of real estate transactions in which hapless sellers are invariably at the mercy of sharp
and greedy developers from whom the courts must provide protection. Professor Hetland seems to be instructing the court to ignore
the language of the statute and ignore the contract of the parties and
instead to decide for the party with the greater relative "equities."
Seven years later, this is exactly what the Supreme Court did in
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. Hetland I, supra note 27, at 160 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (emphasis added).

Spangler v. Memel,35 when Justice Traynor followed the Professor's
advice. However, the comparison of the "relative equities" of the
seller and buyer in Spangler was disguised by repeated murmuring
of the fictions that posed as analysis in Brown and Roseleaf.
SPANGLER

V. MEMEL: THE WEIGHT OF FICTIONS TILT THE SCALE

The facts in Spangler are important and will be reviewed in some
detail. In 1956 Mr. and Mrs. Spangler purchased a lot on Sunset
Boulevard in Los Angeles for $43,000. At the time, the property was
improved with a single family residence that Mr. Spangler subsequently converted into an office for his advertising business. The
property was zoned for commercial use and appreciated in value over
the years because of the possibility of commercial office building development on the site.
Il 1960 Mr. and Mrs. Spangler listed the property for sale
through a real estate broker. Thereafter, Mr. Spangler quit-claimed
all of his interest in the property to Mrs. Spangler.
After approximately a month of negotiations, a contract was made
between Mrs. Spangler and the purchasers for sale of the property
for $90,000, payable as $26,100 in cash, plus a promissory note for
$63,900 secured by a purchase-money deed of trust. In the purchase
agreement Mrs. Spangler agreed to subordinate her purchase-money
deed of trust to construction loans up to the amount of $2,000,000.
Obviously, the development of the property contemplated by the parties was quite significant compared to its existing value.
In conjunction with the subordination agreement, each of the buyers individually waived the benefits of 580b in the contract and gave
a written personal guarantee of joint and several liability for payment of the $63,900 purchase-money promissory note. These waivers
and guarantees were for the specific purpose of protecting Mrs.
Spangler against the hazard that her purchase-money deed of trust
might become worthless
in the future following foreclosure of the
3
construction loan. 6
Following close of escrow, the buyer transferred the property to a
development partnership, which obtained a construction loan of
$408,000 in order to construct an office building on the property.
Pursuant to the agreement to subordinate, Mrs. Spangler executed a
subordination agreement in favor of the construction lender, The
partnership proceeded to construct a three-story commercial office
35.
36.
financial
struction

Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972).
No doubt her capable lawyer was cognizant of the Brown holding and of the
risk to the seller inherent in subordination of her deed of trust to a large conloan.
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building on the property. However, in spite of diligent efforts to obtain tenants, the building was never a commercial success and the
buyers defaulted under the construction loan. The construction
lender foreclosed, and Mrs. Spangler sued for a judgment against
the buyers under the purchase-money note and personal guarantees.
The trial court, giving effect to the buyers' negotiated written
guarantees and waivers of 580b, granted judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the balance of the note plus interest and costs.
When the case reached the California Supreme Court it summarized the positions of the parties as follows:
[Buyers] contend that [Seller] is actually attempting to obtain a deficiency
judgment in connection with a purchase money deed of trust, that any such
recovery is barred by section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure as construed in Brown v. Jensen, and that [Buyer's] guaranty and waiver, being
merely an attempt to circumvent the above statute, is illegal and unenforceable. [Seller], on the contrary, urges that Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino has
impliedly overruled Brown v. Jensen to the extent that section 580b cannot
be applied to sold-out junior lienors seeking recovery of the purchase
price.-1

The court then focused primarily on the argument of whether
Brown had been overruled and completely ignored the question of
whether waiver and release of rights under 580b was enforceable
under the circumstances.38 The court engaged in lengthy review of
Brown and Roseleaf to support its holding "that the application of
Roseleaf to the facts of this case compels the conclusion that section
580b is here inapplicable." 3 9
The seller, of course, had picked up Professor Hetland's argument
that Roseleaf impliedly overruled Brown's holding that 580b applies
to protect the buyer even when the seller's junior lien is "sold out"
by foreclosure of a senior encumbrance. The court specifically reaffirmed Brown and said it had "never over-ruled or modified"40 the
central holding of Brown that 580b "states that in no event shall
there be a deficiency judgment, that is, whether there is a sale under
the power of sale or sale under foreclosure, or no sale because the
security has become valueless or is exhausted."'" The court noted
37. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 498 P.2d at 1058, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
38. It is remarkable that this point was never even addressed since effectiveness of
the waiver and guaranty was the stated basis of the trial court judgment.
39. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 609, 498 P.2d at 1058, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
40. Id. at 609, 498 P.2d at 1059, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
41. Id. at 609, 498 P.2d at 1058, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (citing Brown v. Jensen, 41
Cal. 2d 193, 198, 259 P.2d 425, 427 (1953)).

that in Roseleaf and subsequent cases42 the court had "assumed
without argument or question that section 580b applied by its terms
to sold-out junior lienors."'43
Perhaps because of its concentration on refuting Professor Hetland's and plaintiff's theory that Brown was impliedly overruled by
Roseleaf, the court stepped through the looking glass into the
Roseleaf fiction of "the standard purchase money transaction" in
search of its decision in the case. The court repeated its Roseleaf
statement that if the transaction "is a variation on the standard
purchase money mortgage or deed of trust," then it should be examined to determine whether application of 580b subserves the purposes of section 580b as explicated by us in Roseleaf and
Bargioni."'4 The court said,
The crux of the matter is, of course, whether a sale of real property for

commercial development in which the vendor agrees to subordinate his senior lien under the purchase money deed of trust to the liens of lenders of the
construction money for the commercial development is a variation on the
standard purchase money mortgage transaction. It seems clear that it is. In
the standard transaction the vendor usually sells the property to a purchaser

who is going to continue the same or similar use of the property. The Present security value of the property, therefore, is a reliable indicator of its
actual fair market value. However, in the situation where the vendor agrees
to subordinate his lien to the purchaser's construction loan, the purchaser
does not intend to continue with the same use of the property but actually
intends a different use which contemplates considerable improvement of it.
In this latter situation, the present security value of the property, therefore,
is not a reliable indicator of the ultimate value of the property; that value

will be determined by the success5 of the venture which contemplates a
change in the use of the property.4

Thus the court thought it was "clear" that a potential change in
use through commercial development of the property must in itself
constitute a variation on a "standard" purchase-money transaction. 46
Why this should be so is far from clear in the dynamic California
urban real estate market of recent decades. Real estate development
is a significant statewide industry. Indeed, from a real estate practitioner's viewpoint it could be said that real estate transactions in
which development or change of use is contemplated by the buyer
are very "standard" and normal transactions. The theoretical basis
for the court's determination, that change of use or development constitutes "variation" appears to be that where development by the
buyer is contemplated; the "security value of the property" doesn't
42. Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal. 2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963);
Kistler v. Vasi, 71 Cal. 2d 261, 455 P.2d 106, 78 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1969).
43. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 610, 498 P.2d at 1059, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
44. Id. at 611, 498 P.2d at 1059, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
45. Id. at 611, 498 P.2d at 1059-60, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12 (citations omitted).
46. The court glossed over the fact that the house on the property had already
been converted to commercial and office use, so it could be argued there really was no
change in use, even though a new building was built.
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provide a reliable indicator of the "actual fair market value." 4
The court developed this theme further, saying that in the "standard" transaction "the security value of the land gives purchasers a
clue as to its true market value." 48 The court presumed that in the
"standard" purchase-money mortgage transaction where the purchaser has not been able to meet the value placed on the land by the
seller through "normal cash down payment and obtaining from a
third party lender a loan for the balance of the purchase price," it is
obvious that a loan large enough could not be obtained since the
amount of the loan would exceed "the security value."49 The court
suggested that the inability of a buyer to obtain the purchase price
from a lender using the land as security "should warn the vendor
that he is perhaps overvaluing the land, and that he insists, at50his
peril, upon his premium price secured by a second trust deed."1
This analysis really amounts to a disguised application of Professor Hetland's suggestion, in Hetland II, that balancing "the equities" between buyer and seller should control. 51 Without saying so,
the court implicitly revived the discredited Brown fiction that in a
"standard" transaction, the seller supposedly has superior knowledge
of property value and added the idea that the buyer therefore needs
"clues" to the value based on the amount of third-party financing he
can obtain. The court implies an unexplained ability on the seller's
part to fix the value at a premium by somehow imposing a second
deed of trust on the buyer who is in the dark about true value. Thus,
in the "standard" transaction the equities presumably reside with the
hapless buyer. However, in a development subordination transaction,
the court said the seller does not have a clue to the value of property
because of prospective change of use, so the equities suddenly shift
from the buyer to the seller.52

47. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 611, 498 P.2d at 1060, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 812. This
theory looks like the obverse of the notion put forward in Roseleaf that one of the purposes of section 580b was to place the risk of inadequate security on the seller thus
supposedly discouraging the seller from overvaluing the security and discouraging precarious land promotions schemes. If the seller does not have a reliable "indicator" of value
how can it be fair to sanction the seller for "overvaluing?" Or to put it another way, is
the court saying that the seller is invariably the "greater fool" where the parties contemplate development of the property?
48. Id. at 612, 498 P.2d at 1060-61, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 613, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.

ANALYSIS OF SPANGLER AND ITS CONFUSED OFFSPRING

The whole line of rationalization expressed in Spangler is a simplistic and illusory view of real estate transactions. The notion of
"security value," which reverses the balance of equities, is extremely
elusive and ill-defined. The value of a real property in a purchase
and sale transaction is not a static thing determined or imposed by
one side or the other of a transaction. Sellers ask, buyers offer. They
either meet at a common negotiated ground of agreed price and
terms or no transaction occurs.
Fair market value is that value which is presumed to be determined at arm's length between a willing seller and a willing buyer,
both reasonably well informed, and neither subject to conditions of
duress. In a dynamic real estate market many factors influence the
willingness of a buyer and seller to agree on price and terms and
hence affect fair market value. Such factors include existing and potential future uses of the property, perceived direction of changes in
the market, availability and cost of financing, governmental restrictions, zoning laws, environmental conditions, tax impacts, terms and
conditions for payment, and general economic conditions. What a
third-party lender may be willing to lend on a particular piece of
property is certainly determined primarily by the market value as
perceived by the lender, but is also affected by the income and expenses of the property, the cost and availability to the lender of
funds, the conditions of the secondary mortgage market, the terms of
the loan, the buyer's intended use of the property, and the riskaverseness of the particular lender involved.
There simply is no empirical basis for the notion, espoused in
Brown and adopted in Spangler, that sellers as a group necessarily
have more knowledge of the value of their properties than do buyers,
or for the idea that any construct of law is needed to prevent sellers
from "overvaluing" their properties. Sellers naturally want the highest price they can get and buyers naturally want the lowest, but who
has the most knowledge about value in a given transaction is a function of individual market sophistication, not a function of status as a
buyer or a seller.
Similarly, there is no empirical or logical foundation for the Supreme Court's notion that "the security value of the property" is
somehow an indicator or a clue to the buyer of the market value, or
that it is a deterrent to overvaluation by the seller. "Security value,"
whatever that means, may be relevant to a third-party lender who
puts out hard cash with the expectation of a return on investment
and repayment of principal. From a lender's point of view security
value is a measure of adequacy of collateral for protection of principal and income repayment and is affected by, among other things,
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cash flow from the property, the general credit worthiness of the borrower, the length of the loan, and the availability of other collateral
and sources of repayment. On the other hand, the concept of "security value" between buyer and seller is largely meaningless. Buyer
and seller are interested in price, terms and conditions of payment,
and risk. The price and financing terms of a real estate purchase
agreement are usually negotiated in dynamic interrelationship. They
are affected by many considerations on both sides of the table, such
as tax factors, interest rates, timing of performance by either party,
the relative negotiating strength of the parties, and all the factors
influencing a seller's and buyer's valuation of the property itself.
Having created a fictional scale of knowledge and "clues" to value
upon which to weigh the equities, the court in Spangler then suggested that where a seller agrees to subordinate his or her purchasemoney deed of trust, the risk of failure of the development "is thrust
upon the vendor,"53 which in turn tilts the scale away from the buyer
in favor of the seller. To counteract the risk "thrust upon the vendor," the developer buyer needs to have a realistic assessment of the
likelihood of success and must therefore be forced, by the threat of
personal liability on a sold-out junior purchase-money deed of trust,
"to exert his highest efforts" to carry out the project successfully.54
Therefore 580b protection is denied to the buyer by a court-created
equitable exception.
The court's method of analysis in Spangler results in several surprising turnabouts. First, in Roselea 5 5 and again in Spangler56 the
court said one of the purposes of 580b is to discourage sellers from
overvaluing their property, yet Spangler views the seller as an unwitting victim of uncertain valuation in subordination transactions, thus
justifying a decision not to apply section 580b.
53. Id.
54. Id. This observation by the court not only overlooks the fact that in the case
before it the trial court had found that the developer had made "diligent efforts" to
obtain tenants for the building, Id. at 606, 498 P.2d at 1056, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 808, but
it also overlooks the reality of the marketplace which already places very substantial
pressures on any developer-buyer to exert his best efforts to conclude a successful development. Not the least of these pressures are the potential loss of equity investment, loss
of projected profits on the transaction, and personal liability on a construction loan guarantee. Once again, the court's analysis is but a reformulation in different words of Professor Hetland's suggestion that sellers as a class require judicial protection from
developer buyers as a class.
55. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 877 (1963).
56. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 612, 498 P.2d at 1060, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 812.

Second, it is true that in a subordinated purchase-money transaction the seller often bears a part of the risk of the development in the
sense that the full value of the seller's subordinated note and deed of
trust may not be realized by the seller unless the development is successful. But the court specifically notes that the market value of
property in a contract being sold for development is often substantially influenced by the development potential of the property.5 7 This
recognition necessarily admits that the seller will very often share in
the reward of a successful development through a negotiated contract price that is higher than would have been obtained if the development potential had not been considered by the parties in the
purchase. 58 Why is it fair and equitable that a seller should share in
the potential benefit of increased value (overvaluation?) but, by a
rule of law that section 580b cannot apply to such transactions, remain insulated from the risk?
'Third, the court ignores the fact that the purchaser developer
often has a substantial cash investment in the project in the form of
down payment, option payments, engineering and design fees,
processing costs, and the like, and has usually made personal guarantees on the construction loan which may be many times larger
than the seller's subordinated second. Compared to these potential
losses, does potential personal liability on a note to the seller really
add anything to the buyer's motivation to be realistic in assessing the
fair market value of the property and the chances for success of the
project? The facts of the case presented to the Supreme Court in
Spangler certainly do not so indicate. 59
In summary, in Spangler the Supreme Court adopted and then
enlarged upon the unfortunate and unnecessary fictions created in
the Brown and Roseleaf decisions in order to create an exception to
clear statutory language. The decision in Spangler closely follows
the "equities" balancing approach espoused by Professor Hetland in
Hetland II even though the ''equities" identified in the decision are
extremely speculative and have little connection to the real world of
negotiated agreements. The superficial balancing of equities, proposed by Hetland II and adopted by the Supreme Court in Spangler,
is based on broad-brush assumptions about buyers and sellers as
classes of persons rather than on any empirical data about real
57. Id. at 613, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
58. This is particularly true when the seller agrees to subordinate, as is well known
in the real estate industry. See, e.g., Leon J. Alexander, Subdivision Trusts: A Proposed
Standard Form, 5 Loy. L. REv. 487, 492 n.21 (1972) ("A rule of thumb in the subdivision business puts the price of land with a subordination agreement at 125% of the price
of land without such an agreement.").
59. As noted in the text following note 36, supra, the new construction was successfully completed, and the court specifically acknowledged the buyer's "diligent" efforts to obtain tenants.
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transactions.60 Perhaps most significantly, even though the final bal-

ancing of the scale in Spangler was based on the risk being "thrust"
upon the seller, the court blatantly ignored the fact that the buyer
and seller had negotiated and explicitly agreed for themselves on a

contractual allocation of the risk inherent in the sellers'
subordination.
In spite of its reliance on the fictions created by Brown and
Roseleaf, its deeply flawed reasoning about the nature of transactions in the real estate marketplace, and its refusal to address a key
element of the parties' contractual agreement, Spangler has been
blindly followed and embroidered upon in a number of subsequent
appellate decisions. 1
One of the first appellate decisions to follow Spangler was Long v.

Superior Court (Rickert).2 The facts were not in dispute. Plaintiff
had been the owner of a single family home in which he also maintained an office. Plaintiff investigated the market and determined
that while the property was worth about $150,000 as a single family

residence, it could be worth $250,000 if sold for development of five
condominiums. Through a broker, plaintiff sought and found a

builder with whom he negotiated an agreement to sell the property
60. It is also worth noting that the protection of subordinating sellers that the
court sought to achieve is of doubtful utility in practical terms. When the senior lender
has foreclosed, the seller's right to sue the failed developer for a deficiency judgment is
frequently worthless as far as collectibility is concerned. This point was aptly noted in an
otherwise uncritical casenote on Spangler. Stephen D. Quinn, Note, Recent Case, 13
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 170, 173 (1972).
61. The Spangler decision was discussed and criticized at some length in David A.
Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries Again, 22
UCLA L. REV. 753 (1975). Professor Leipziger cogently observed that Spangler failed to
provide "accurate guidance in predicting the outcome of future disputes." Id. at 756.
Professor Leipziger's analysis of Spangler and the 1974 decision of Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974), led him to conclude
the Supreme Court was moving in the direction of distinguishing between residential and
commercial borrowers in the application of sections 580b and 726 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. As will be noted infra, the authors of the proposed new California foreclosure
and antideficiency laws adopted this approach. Spangler was also the subject of a student
note, Craig M. Thomas, Note, Application of Antideficiency Statute to ConstructionSubordination Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 536 (1973), which essentially agreed with
Hetland's analysis that Brown should be considered overruled. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. The writer asserted that "Spangler reaches a correct result in shifting
the risk of loss to the commercial developer in the subordination context," but noted
forthrightly that "the difficulty with the case, however, is not its result but its potential
and uncertain application to other fact situations." Id. at 546-47. Consistent with one of
the principal concerns of this Article, the writer concluded, "Spangler has introduced
much uncertainty into the world of real estate transactions .... " Id. at 548.
62. Long v. Superior Court (Rickert), 170 Cal. App. 3d 499, 216 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1985).

for $252,000 to be paid with a cash downpayment of $134,000, plus
a note for the balance secured by a deed of trust on the property.
The deed of trust was subordinated to a $682,000 construction loan.
(The opinion does not indicate whether this occurred at close of escrow or later.) Construction of the project was successfully completed, but the units were not sold in time to pay off the construction
loan, and the lender foreclosed.
The plaintiff's broker testified that plaintiff had established his
$250,000 asking price on the basis of his belief that five condominium units could be built on the property. The broker testified that
plaintiff had told him he "was aware that if the project bombs out,
he would lose his money carried back."' 63 The trial court apparently
accepted this testimony as truthful and ruled that Spangler was not
applicable to the facts of the case, as the plaintiff had presumably
knowingly accepted the risk of loss of his security. The trial court's
minute order said, "Here plaintiff Long's conditions of sale substantially protected him since the cash downpayment of $134,000 almost
equalled the intrinsic value of the property ($150,000). Moreover,
Long 64
actively participated in the project and knowingly assumed the
risk."
The court of appeal reviewed the trial court's decision, focusing on
the Spangler rationale that where a "radical" change in the use and
value of the property is contemplated, the "purposes" of 580b are
not served and the seller cannot determine the "security value" of
the property:
[t]he pivotal criterion is that the radical change in use and value contemplated by the buyer, at once renders the security value of the subordinated
purchase money security uncertain. It also significantly jeopardizes the integrity of the purchase money security by imposing the potential of a
noncurable senior deed of trust foreclosure by the construction lender.
Spangler addresses the question as one of providing the benefit of the bargain and assignment of full risk, not as a mediating of respective losses.6 5

Thus recognizing that the question of risk was central to the result
in Spangler, the Long court nevertheless rejected outright the defendant's argument that the facts showed a voluntary assumption of
risk by the seller through his preparation of a prospectus on development of the property, his seeking out of a developer buyer, and his
subordination of his security to obtain a higher price knowing that
foreclosure of his security could result from failure of the project.
The court simply said this line of argument "is wholly refuted by the
fact that the seller in Spangler assumed the same risk for the same
reason." 66 But the seller in Spangler most definitely did not assume
63.

Id. at 502, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 339.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 506, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
66. Id. at 508, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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the same risk; recall that the seller in Spangler negotiated an express
waiver by the buyers of the protections of 580b in order to be sure
the entire risk of foreclosure of the subordinated security rested on
the buyers by contract. As noted however, that waiver was not discussed or given contractual effect by the Supreme Court in Spangler, the court apparently preferring to create the balance-of-equities
approach so grievously misapplied in Long.
The next major case following Spangler was Roffinella v. Sherinian.67 The sellers owned a residential and commercial rental property in downtown Santa Cruz, California. They attempted to develop
the property for senior housing but failed to obtain necessary permits. The property was neglected and was so severely damaged by
vandals that it became uninhabitable. (In the language of Spangler
one is tempted to ask what is the "security value" of such property?)
In contrast to Long, where the owner actively sought out a developer
buyer, the sellers in Roffinella received an unsolicited offer to
purchase the property in which the buyer offered $390,000 to be
paid $112,000 down in cash and $278,000 by a promissory note secured by a first deed of trust on the property. Given that the property was uninhabitable and virtually abandoned, it must be
presumed that the value of the property was not based on any expectation that the existing use (actually nonuse) would be continued. In
fact the purchase contract provided, "Seller to subordinate above
mortgage in escrow to construction loan."" 8
In spite of the provision for subordination "in escrow," a construction loan was not placed on the property at the time of sale, and the
sellers took back a first deed of trust. The sellers' escrow instructions
stated, "Sellers69 herein agree to subordinate to a construction loan at
a later date."
After purchasing the property the buyers were consistently late in
payments to the sellers under their note, and the sellers could have
foreclosed. Instead, the sellers apparently decided to give the buyers
more time to put their development deal together. Approximately
one and a half years after the close of escrow the buyers contacted
the sellers' attorney saying they were ready to obtain a construction
loan, and the buyers requested a subordination agreement. A subordination agreement was negotiated with the sellers' attorney. Under
that agreement the buyers paid a cash consideration of $1,100 to the
67.
68.
69.

Roffinella v. Sherinian, 179 Cal. App. 3d 230, 224 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1986).
Id. at 233, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
Id. at 234, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 504.

sellers for subordination, and they agreed to shorten the term of

their promissory note by five years. In return the sellers agreed to
subordinate the promissory note to a $4.5 million construction loan,
the proceeds of which were to be used by the buyers to build residential condominiums on the property. Unfortunately the project was

not a success and the construction lender foreclosed on the property
with the sellers' note still unpaid.
The Roffinella court repeated almost verbatim Spangler's formulations concerning "security value" and then focused on whether the
transaction was "standard" within the meaning of Roseleaf and
Spangler.7 0 The buyers argued that Spangler shouldn't apply because in Spangler the seller subordinated pursuant to a requirement
of the purchase agreement itself. Further, the vague reference to
subordination in the purchase agreement merged in the deed and so
had no legally binding effect after the closing. Thus, the subordination that actually occurred was not pursuant to the purchase agree-

ment, but rather the later subordination agreement negotiated for a
new consideration between the buyers and the seller's attorney a

year and a half after the sale. The purchase
and sale itself was
71
therefore "standard" the buyers concluded.
In reviewing the record, the court decided that "[ihere is substantial evidence to support the [trial] court's implicit finding that respondents subordinated pursuant to the agreement of sale."' 72 Thus,
the case fit neatly within Spangler's focus on a subordination clause
contained in the agreement of sale, notwithstanding the fact that
new consideration was negotiated for the subordination long after
the purchase. The court therefore concluded that the Spangler exception to 580b applied and the buyers were liable on the note. 73
70. Id. at 237-38, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
71. The buyer argued this point, Id. at 238, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 507, based on the
language of Spangler which said, "However, where the agreement of sale contains a
subordinationclause, a markedly different situation is presented." Spangler v. Memel, 7
Cal. 3d 603, 613, 498 P.2d 1055, 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807, 813 (1972) (emphasis
added).
72. Roffinella, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 239, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
73. The "implicit finding" that subordination was pursuant to the original contract
of sale, which in turn underlies the court's finding that Spangler applies, is problematic
not only in regard to the facts of the case. It also runs into headlong and unresolved
conflict with well-established California case law regarding enforcement of subordination
agreements. In 1967 the California Supreme Court held that, to be enforceable, a subordination agreement contained in a real estate purchase contract "must contain terms that
will define and minimize the risk that the subordinating liens will impair or destroy the
seller's security." Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 581, 422 P.2d 329, 330-31, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 770-71 (1967). Such terms usually include restrictions on use of the funds
(i.e., generally limited to improvement of the property), interest rate and repayment
terms, maximum amount, and other key parameters of the debt. The naked agreement
"to subordinate above mortgage in escrow to construction loan" or "to subordinate to a
construction loan at a later date" as set forth in the Roffinella purchase agreement and
escrow instructions obviously fails to meet the test of Handy v.Gordon. If the Roffinella
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However, it appears that the real key to the decision in Roffinella
was once again a normative or "equitable" view of who should bear
the risk of loss in a sale for development transaction. The court
stated simply, "The risk of loss should also be placed on appellants
because respondents subordinated their deed of trust to a $4.5 million construction loan. Respondents were
thereby prevented from
'74
foreclosing when appellants defaulted.
This final statement by the court is hard to square with the fact
revealed in the opinion that there was a considerable period of time
during which the buyer was in default before the seller subordinated
the deed of trust. Sellers could have foreclosed without hindrance of
a construction loan; instead they elected not to in order to allow the
buyers more "time to put the[ir] deal together. 17 5 The court also
seems to ignore the fact that the sellers voluntarily bargained for
their subordinated position for additional consideration consisting of
a cash payment, a shortened term of the note, and other concessions
by the buyer. Under these circumstances the conclusion that the entire risk "should" rest on the buyer begs for a more convincing rationale than the lone fact that the sellers voluntarily subordinated
their deed of trust.
The court gives no compelling reason for transfering the sellers'
obvious risk of loss of part of the price entirely to the buyer, contrary
to the express language of 580b, which provides a statutory shield to
buyers. The sellers obviously had a problem property. From the facts
of the transaction, it may be inferred that the sellers anticipated that
the only chance for them to realize substantial value from the property was for the buyers' development to go forward. The sellers, represented by counsel and receiving additional consideration for their
agreement to do so, freely contracted to place themselves at risk
through the subordination agreement to facilitate the development
and their hope of maximizing their own gain. This was after the
buyers had been in default for a considerable period of time and the
sellers could have foreclosed without risk of losing the property to a
senior lender. Why is this calculated economic decision on the sellers' part (as in the Long case) cause to ignore the plain words of
580b and transfer all of the risk to the buyer when the parties did
court had correctly analyzed the subordination agreement as a new agreement negotiated
and supported by new consideration after the close of the sale, it would at least have had
to recognize explicitly its extension of Spangler.
74. Roffinella, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 240, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
75. Id. at 234, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 504.

not agree to do so in a negotiated contract?
In Ziegler v. Barnes,76 yet another aspect of the Spangler decision
was the focus of argument, and another surprising result was
reached. In Ziegler, the buyer acquired a residential ocean view lot
in Laguna Beach, California. As part of the consideration, buyer
gave the seller a $185,000 promissory note secured by a deed of
trust, which provided that the seller would subordinate to a construction loan not to exceed $250,000 for the purpose of building a singlefamily residence on the lot.
When the note came due, it was not paid. The seller took no action to foreclose. A month later the buyer requested an increase in
the amount to which the deed of trust could be subordinated. The
buyer offered to pay a $5,000 cash incentive to the seller and to reduce the principal balance of the then-overdue note by a $90,000
payment if the seller would subordinate his deed of trust to a
$370,000 construction loan and extend the debt. These negotiations
took place through, and the offer was accepted by, the seller's attorney. The $5,000 incentive was paid, the $90,000 payment was made,
and a new promissory note in the amount of $95,000 was delivered
to the seller with the deed of trust subordinated to a construction
loan. The buyer proceeded with construction of the home but eventually defaulted on the construction loan. The construction lender
foreclosed.
The buyer argued that there had been no "commercial development" of the property as contemplated by Spangler and therefore no
real change in use."" "Change in use," it will be recalled, was the
critical factor in the Spangler analysis that the Supreme Court said
prevents the buyer from having a "clue" to the market value.78 The
buyer urged that the property was acquired as a residential lot and
.the project constructed was a single family residence. In finding that
the Spangler exception applied and 580b did not, the court of appeal
said that the lot was not "in use" when it was sold, and the fact that
the purchaser envisioned a considerable improvement of the property
by construction of an expensive residence brought the case within the
reach of Spangler. 9 But it is clear that the seller also contemplated
the construction of an expensive residence; the possibility of constructing an expensive residence on an ocean view lot was precisely
what gave the lot substantial market value in the seller's hands. The
decision in Ziegler once again comes down to the approach of pity
for the seller. The court stated,
76.
77.
614, 498
78.
79.

Ziegler v. Barnes, 200 Cal. App. 3d 224, 246 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1988).
Id. at 231, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (quoting Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603,
P.2d 1055, 1062, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807, 814 (1972)).
Spangler,-7 Cal. 3d at 613, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
Ziegler, 200 Cal. App. 2d at 233, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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Here, at the time the new note was executed, there was no construction
on the Laguna lot; [the seller] had no more notion of what the property
would be worth, if timely and efficiently improved, than he did when the
first agreement of sale was prepared. He was neither a builder nor a developer. His only alternative to agreeing to the increased construction loan was
to lose the sale of the property.
The risks attendant in subordinating were substantial: the lot was vacant;
although a view lot, the terrain was precipitous and difficult to build upon;
there were myriad permits to obtain; the construction loan was due less
than one year after it was obtained; interest rates were highly volatile; and,
the residence would need to be built and sold speedily. [The seller] was
"relegated to reliance upon [his] respective buyers to perform successfully
and fully pay the purchase balance."80

But if the seller had no notion of what the property was worth if
improved, how did the seller know what it was worth when he sold it
as an unimproved lot? The lot had worth because it could be built
on, worth resulting from supply and demand factors, worth in which
the seller shared by obtaining the price of an ocean view lot that
could be built on, rather than the price of a lot lacking such amenities and entitlements. The seller's loss was not the result of an error
in judgment regarding worth of the property; the construction lender
foreclosed because the buyer did not make payments on a construction loan. Ziegler is another illustration of the fact that the risk to a
seller in a subordinated purchase-money note transaction has little to
do with the original market value of the property established in
arm's length negotiations between buyer and seller.
Once again in Ziegler, as in Roffinella, the seller seems to have
knowingly taken the risk of subordination at a time when another
option was available (i.e., foreclosure of the first deed of trust for
default under the note). The note was past due and unpaid; seller
could have foreclosed, kept the down payment and recovered the
property to sell it again. It is not clear why the court in Ziegler
thought this was so unpalatable a choice. ("His only alternative. .

.

. was to lose the sale.""1 ) Instead, the seller chose to take a

$90,000 partial pay-down of the note and a $5,000 incentive payment, and to accept subordination to a construction loan, no doubt
hoping he would thereby realize payment in full. In the language of
Spangler, the risk was not "thrust upon" the seller at all; it was
quite clearly voluntarily accepted for consideration. A seller's rejection of the opportunity to foreclose is scant reason to throw aside the
80. Ziegler, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 232, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (third alteration in
original) (quoting Long v. Superior Court (Rickert), 170 Cal. App. 3d 499, 507, 216
Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (1985)).
81. Id.

express rule of 580b that would have applied if the seller had foreclosed when he had the right to do so.
Boyle v. Sweeney, 82 is another case in which the "change in use"
rational of Spangler was tested with a fact pattern somewhat similar
to Ziegler's. The property was an improved residential property in
San Francisco. In the sale transaction, the seller took back a $50,000
note and deed of trust. The buyer planned to tear down the existing
single family home on the lot and to build a three-unit residential
condominium. The seller's note was subordinated to a construction
loan. The purchase-money note due date was extended by the seller
twice during-the course of construction of the project. The construction project was completed, but the buyer was unable to sell the
units in time to avoid default and foreclosure under the construction
loan.
Merely repeating the language from Spangler, the court determined that the transaction was not a "standard" transaction within
the meaning of Roseleaf and Spangler. Here again, the buyer argued that the transaction was not "a variation" because the contemplated improvement of the property was not a commercial
development or a change in use. Although there was no change in
use, the court nevertheless found that Spangler applied because "a
more intensive use" was contemplated and "that makes the present
value of the property an unreliable indicator of its actual fair market
value." 83
In Boyle the court fell into the same illusory view of value that
bedeviled the Spangler decision. In referring to "actual fair market
value" in contrast to the "present value of the property," the court
seems to suggest that real estate "value" is a detached ideal or theoretical value which is only reflected by artifices such as "present
value" and "security value." As noted above, however, in a real estate market the fair market value is the value that is agreed upon by
a willing buyer and a willing seller, not a ghost or shadow number
hiding behind a different or misleading "present value."
The fact patterns of Long, Roffinella, Ziegler, and Boyle show
several important things that bear on further analysis of Spangler as
policy.84 First, the concept of "value," whether it be fair market
82. Boyle v. Sweeney, 207 Cal. App. 3d 998, 255 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1989).
83. Id. at 1005, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
84. To add sheer wonderment to the surprises that spring out of the Pandora's box
opened by Spangler, see Wright v. Johnson, 206 Cal. App. 3d 333, 253 Cal. Rptr. 418
(1988). In that case the plaintiff sold farmland for $1.5 million with a $300,000 cash
down payment. The buyer later refinanced the property with a new first lien of
$1,666,670 to which the seller subordinated. The land remained farm land; no change in
use or commercial development was contemplated. When the buyer defaulted, the seller
sued for judicial foreclosure and a deficiency judgment. The court determined that the
transaction was "varietal" (i.e., a variation on the "standard," using the language of
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value as determined by arm's length negotiation, or some more ethereal concept of "security value," really has little to do with the decisions other than to confuse them with meaningless distinctions
between "present value," "actual value," "fair market value," and
"security value." The loss to the parties does not appear in any of
these cases to result from overvaluation, undervaluation, or anything
else having to do with value of the 'property agreed upon in the
purchase and sale transaction itself. Rather, the loss arises from factors such as the financial ability of the buyers, the timing and market factors influencing disposition of the developed property, the
decisions of the construction lender to foreclose or not, the willingness of the sellers to extend and subordinate defaulted debt rather
than foreclose, and a host of other factors that may be rolled up into
a comprehensive term commonly known as "risk." In Spangler the
buyer completed construction but was unsuccessful, in spite of "diligent efforts," to obtain tenants. In Roffinella the buyer, who was
consistently late in payments on the note prior to subordination, nevertheless completed construction of the project after subordination
but apparently could not sell the units in time to satisfy the construction lender. This seems also to have been the case in Boyle.
The courts in each case decry that the risk of development in such
cases "is thrust upon the vendor."8 5 However, by directing the analysis into hairsplitting between "standard" transactions and "variations," and by ignoring that a significant part of real estate value in
the marketplace is the potential of the property foi" change of use
and development, the courts have reacted to risk as merely an excuse
for unthinking sympathy for the seller rather than as a subject for
analysis, negotiation, and contractual allocation. They have thus
failed to focus on the fact that in real estate transactions, especially
those involving potential development of the property, risk is virtually always one of the primary subjects of negotiation between the
parties.
Spangler) but shifted focus from change in use (which did not happen) to the size of the
debt to which the seller subordinated, saying,
It is clear, however, that it is the substantiality of the non-purchase money lien
to which the seller subordinates in proportion to the value of the security it
encumbers, that determines whether the transaction is so non-standard that it
places the buyer/borrower outside section 580b.
Id. at 338, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
If the seller consented to subordination to debt exceeding the value of the property,
thus "overvaluing" it, and the purpose of 580b is to prevent "overvaluing," why should
580b not apply?
85. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 612, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.

The underlying "equities" rationale for the Spangler line of cases,
in spite of its elaborate and confusing trappings, is really based upon
the notion of protecting sellers as a class from developers as a class,
even though the price exacted by sellers who sell to developers is
usually enhanced by the development potential of the property sold.
In counterbalance to the simplistic, protectionist approach of
Spangler, consider the following hypothetical transaction: The seller
has for many years owned a prime parcel of real property in a developing urban area, which is improved with six old homes. He has carried it speculatively with an eye to the gentrification and growing
development of the area. The rental income from the property has
covered the taxes and carrying costs which, thanks to Proposition 13,
are now relatively low. The owner, recognizing the development potential of the property, secures approval of the local government
agencies for a tentative subdivision map permitting development of
the property into a twenty-eight unit town home project, and he
secures a preliminary commitment for a construction loan from a
willing lender. The owner also prepares detailed financial projections
for the development, construction, and sale of the project with construction cost estimates, sales projections, cash flows, and the like.
Using rather commonplace appraisal techniques and data from numerous sales of town homes and condominiums in the rapidly developing area, the owner determines a fair builder's overhead and profit
for the project, a developer's profit, and an "as is" fair market value
estimation for the property, which of course is substantially in excess
of the amount he could borrow on the property based on its net cash
flow from the rental of the six old houses.
The owner then presents his entire development and financial
package to several builders. After negotiation with them he enters
into a contract for sale of the property, plans, tentative map, construction loan commitment, and the rest of the development package
for a negotiated price, half of which is to be paid by a note secured
by a second deed of trust on the property. In the negotiations the
seller initially stated he was not willing to subordinate to a construction loan. However, in the final negotiations the owner agrees to
subordinate after the builder offers a somewhat higher price and a
better interest rate on the second note.
It turns out that the owner underestimated the cost of construction
and overestimated the potential sales proceeds. Also it takes nine
months longer than he anticipated to actually get the new units all
built, and there is a definite cooling of sales during the extended
project build out. As a result of these factors, the builder/buyer defaults on the construction loan, and the seller's subordinated
purchase-money deed of trust is foreclosed out.
When the owner sues the builder/buyer on the note, he of course
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says that under Spangler and its progeny this was, as a matter of
law, a "variation" on the standard purchase-money transaction because the transaction contemplated substantial development and
more intensive use of the property by the buyer. As such, the poor
seller could not have had a clue as to the security value of his property, and the buyer must be personally liable on the sold-out junior
note in spite of 580b and Brown. Otherwise the seller's subordination
to the construction loan would unfairly have the result of thrusting
onto him the entire risk of the development that he conceived,
planned, packaged, and sold to the buyer. Seller would no doubt argue, citing from the decision in Boyle, that "the only possible protection available to the vendor is to allow a deficiency judgment against
'
the developer purchaser." 86
There would appear to be no way out of the conclusion that under
Spangler and its progeny such a transaction would result in liability
of the buyer on the promissory note, even though no equitable reason
appears in such facts to protect the seller as opposed to the buyer,
particularly under the mandate of 580b. Maybe the court would decide that such facts are so clearly a "variation" on the "standard"
nonstandard transaction that the rule applicable to the standard
transaction should apply after all, instead of the rule applicable to
the usual nonstandard transaction. Or, as a commentator stated
about Ziegler v. Barnes, maybe the court could just admit that
"[1logic and rules have left this field; decisions result from courts'
perceptions of the equities. .

.

.[F]orget the statutes, the nature of

the transaction, and the provisions of the contract. [Just let the good
guy win.]"8 "
There must be a better way to decide these cases. The courts do
not give useful guidance to parties to such transactions by decisions
that disguise searches for ad hoc equitable solutions in costumes of
speculation about unrevealed "purposes" of 580b, or that continue
fictions that sellers have inherently greater knowledge of value, or
assert that some ideal "value" exists distinct from the actual fair
market value established by negotiated agreement of buyer and
seller, or that ask us to imagine that real estate transactions come in
distinguishable packages labeled "standard" and "variation." 88
86. Boyle, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 1003, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
87. 11 CEB REAL PROP. L. REP. 127, 128 (1988).
88. For more hairsplitting of "standard" and "variation," see Thompson v. Allert,
233 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 285 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1991), where the seller of a multi-unit
residential building agreed to subordinate after closing to a new loan of approximately
20% of the purchase price to finance "renovations" of a "purely cosmetic" nature. The

SOME CONCLUSIONS: MAY WE RELY ON CONTRACT?

The better way to decide cases involving subordinated purchase
money liens is to look at the parties' contractual agreements instead
of their status as a buyer or a seller. What is really at stake in these
cases is not subservience to the "purposes" of section 580b, whatever
they might actually be, but allocation of risk between buyers and
sellers of development property. In the real world, next to price and
terms, the subject of risk is probably the most intensely negotiated
aspect of most purchase and, sale agreements involving the sale of
real property for development. The California Supreme Court in
Spangler did not need to resort to fictions in order to decide the fair
allocation of the risk in that case. The buyer and seller had already
done it by contract; there was a negotiated waiver of section 580b
and personal guaranty by the buyers. No risk had been "thrust
upon" the seller; the seller had negotiated for it to be assumed by the
buyer by contract.89 All the court had to do was find that in a freely
bargained exchange of subordination agreement for waiver of 580b
and guaranty, the contractual waiver and guaranty should be
binding.
The Spangler line of cases presents situations very frequently encountered in the real estate market in California and other growing
areas of the country. The parties were represented by legal counsel
and were dealing with an anticipated development of the property.
The price realized by the seller was enhanced by the immediate
prospect of development. There were market risks and benefits to
both sides arising from the transaction, risk and benefits that were
part of their negotiations.
To do away with the unpredictability of a rule based on an illdefined notion of "standard" transactions, speculative statutory
"purposes," confusion about the meaning of value, and vague ideas
of equity between buyers and sellers as potentially victimized classes,
clarity in the law and predictability in the market place should be
established by adherence to two basic propositions in 580b subordination cases:
1. As Brown v. Jensen determined, "in no event" does 580b permit
a deficiency judgment on a note secured by a purchase-money deed
of trust on the property sold. 90 As interpreted in Brown v. Jensen,
court held that Spangler was inapplicable because there was no significant change in use
of the property. Id. at 1467, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Compare the overvaluation aspect of
this case with Wright v. Johnston discussed supra note 84.
89. None of the numerous comments and articles discussing Spangler and cited in
this Article discusses the question of contractual allocation of risk by use of 580b waivers. In fact most of the academic discussions of Spangler do not even mention the buyer's
guaranty and waiver in presentation of the facts of the case.
90. Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d at 198, 259 P.2d at 427.
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the words "in no event" preclude a deficiency judgment in the event
of a sold-out junior lien, unless the parties otherwise agree.,"
2. The parties to real estate transactions involving purchase-money
deeds of trust should be free to bargain about waiver of 580b protection. As in Spangler, the seller may well insist on a waiver if the
buyer requires subordination to a construction loan. After all, no
buyer is compelled to purchase a property; if the buyer does not
want the risk, he or she can shop elsewhere. Allocation of risk of
failure of a development project is one of the terms and conditions of
such a sale, and there is no compelling reason to have courts decide
that allocation a priori for the parties after the fact, rather than
have it decided by the parties themselves through the course of their
negotiations and contractual agreements.
The suggestion that freedom of contract govern in such cases runs
counter to the accepted wisdom about whether 580b may be waived
by contract. Looking back to Spangler, it is possible that Justice
Traynor's failure to consider the buyer's waiver of 580b is traceable
to Professor Hetland's articles. In addition to urging the court to
protect sellers from developer buyers on ill-defined considerations of
comparative equities in Hetland II, Hetland said in Hetland I that
waiver of 580b is not permissible. He asserted, "Although 580b is
not within the no waiver statute, [section 2953 of the California
Civil Code], the statute is nonwaivable." '9 2
Did the Supreme Court in Spangler merely assume that the
buyer's waiver of 580b was beyond the pale of consideration because
of Professor Hetland's pronouncements? 93
Professor Hetland's assertion in Hetland I was not supported by
the cases cited. 94 The issue in Lucky Investments, Inc. v. Adams9 5

was whether certain title company holding agreements that were

91.

Id.

92. Hetland I, supra note 27, at 17 n.71 (citations omitted).
93. A more jaundiced view would suggest the Supreme Court was so anxious to
create the new "equitable" rule that it simply ignored the waiver issue as inconvenient to
the court's purposes. There would certainly be an uncomfortable logical inconsistency in
an opinion that analyzed a contractual waiver to find it contrary to public policy, but
then on equitable grounds reached precisely the same result that would have occurred
through validation of the waiver.
94. Subsequently, however, the court of appeal held that 580b cannot be waived;
see infra text accompanying notes 109-18 for discussion of Palm v. Schilling, 199 Cal.
App. 3d 63, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988).
95. Lucky Inv., Inc. v. Adams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 462, 7 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1960).

substituted for a purchase-money deed of trust were security instru-

ments to which 580b applied. The court held that they were. In passing, the court also made the comment that, whatever the intent of

the parties in substituting the holding agreement for a note and deed
of trust, the buyer "could not waive the protection of section 580b in
advance."9' In support of that statement the court cited Freedlandv.

Greco.97 Freedland, however, did not involve 580b. The Freedland

case required construction of Section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the court specifically said, "Nor is there any contention

that either the mortgage or trust deed was a purchase money security and thus controlled by Section 580b . ...
-"1 Thus, neither Lucky
Investments nor Freedland considered the questions of negotiated
contractual waiver of 580b, and they cannot be considered controlling precedent on the issue.

It must be said, however, that Professor Hetland was not alone in
asserting without precise decisional authority that 580b cannot be
waived. For example, in Russell v. Roberts,9" the court of appeal
considered whether waiver of 580b in a loan extension agreement
was valid. In that case the court stated, "California's courts have
repeatedly held that the provisions of section 580b may not be
waived in advance by the vendee at the time of the sale and hypothecation of the property."' 100 In the Russell case the court found that

waiver of 580b after the sale and hypothecation of the property was
not barred and was enforceable.101

96. Id. at 61 (citing, see Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d at 462, 467, 289 P.2d
463, 465-66 (1955)).
97. Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955); also one of the
cases cited by Professor Hetland in Hetland I.
98. Freedland,45 Cal. 2d at 465, 289 P.2d at 464.
99. Russell v. Roberts, 39 Cal. App. 3d 390, 114 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1974).
100. Id. at 394-95, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09 (citations omitted).
101. Lucky Investments and Freedland,cited by the Russell court, are discussed
supra and, as noted, did not decide that 580b cannot be contractually waived, because
the issue was not actually presented in either case. Morello v. Metzenbaum, 25 Cal. 2d
494, 154 P.2d 670 (1944), like Freedland,considered 580d, not 580b. Salter v. Ulrich,
22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 P.2d 7 (1943), considered a purported waiver of section 726 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the one form of action rule, not section 580b. Venable v. Harmon, 223 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965), decided the issue of whether a
land sale contract was a security device to which 580b applies, held that it was, and
consequently denied the seller a personal judgment against the buyer for failure to complete the contract. No express contractual waiver of rights under 580b was presented in
the case. Riddle v. Cushing, 203 Cal. App. 2d 831, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1962), involved a
general partnership as purchaser where the general partners signed a personal guaranty.
The court in Riddle stated that in Freedland it was held that "the provisions of 580b
may not be waived in advance by the debtor." As noted above, Freedland did not so
hold. However, the finding that the general partners of the borrower partnership could
not be held personally liable on the partnership purchase-money promissory note was
correct. The guaranty by a general partner of the partnership's note is a nullity because
the general partner is already liable. See Union Bank v. Dorn, 254 Cal. App. 2d 157, 61
Cal. Rptr. 893 (1967).
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On careful analysis only one of the decisions cited in Russell actually held that 580b cannot validly be waived by contract. That case
was Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner.102 Valinda Builders presented
a Spangler fact pattern, in which a buyer of real property gave a
note and deed of trust to the seller for part of the purchase price,
and the seller subsequently subordinated to a construction loan
which was foreclosed.
The corporate buyer in Valinda Builders was specifically found to
be a mere shell or instrumentality put together by the actual individual buyers for purposes of the transaction. The seller obtained a personal guaranty from the individual principals of the corporate
obligations under the purchase-money note. The guaranty appears to
have contained an express waiver of 580b.
The court then was faced with a question of whether waiver of
580b was valid. It held that such waivers were contrary to public
policy. The court relied heavily on Freedlandv. Greco'0 3 and other
cases construing sections 580d and 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, it should be readily apparent that the policy considerations affecting waiver of sections 580d and 726 on the one hand,
and those underlying 580b on the other, are very different. The rationale of voiding waivers of sections 580d and 726 is the necessity of
borrowers, which can drive them to make ruinous concessions at the
time that a loan is needed and, in the case of section 726, avoidance
of multiple actions. Thus, as stated by the court of appeal in Salter
v. Ulrich,0 4 and as quoted in Russell v. Roberts: "Since necessity
often drives debtors to make ruinous concessions when a loan is
needed, section 726 should be applied to protect them and to prevent
a waiver in advance."' 5 The court in Russell said that this reasoning does not apply after the loan is made when all the rights have
been established and there remains only enforcement of those rights.
Similarly this reasoning should not apply when the necessitousness of
borrowers is presumptively not present.
In a purchase and sale of real estate, the buyer is not in a position
to be necessitous in the sense that borrowers frequently may be. A
buyer is not compelled to buy real property. The sale transaction is
102.
(1964).
103.
104.
105.
(emphasis

Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 Cal. App. 2d 106, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 267, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943).
Russell v. Roberts, 39 Cal. App. 3d 390, 395, 114 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1974)
added) (quoting Salter, 22 Cal. 2d at 267, 138 P.2d at 9).

inherently more freely negotiable and less subject to unfair advantage against the buyer than a loan transaction may be subject to
abuse by a lender. The idea of a necessitous buyer who may be
forced by his necessity to "make ruinous concessions" in his
purchase agreement with the seller just does not make sense, particularly in the context of sale of property to a developer who will be
taking a variety of business risks to carry out the development project. Buyers, whether developers or not, may well be greedy, foolish,
or unsophisticated, but they are not necessitous in the way that borrowers are necessitous.
Valinda Builders should be read as another application (although
misguided in its treatment of the waiver issue), of the principle of
Riddle v. Rushing and Union Bank v. Dorn,10 6 that a partner (or
shareholder of an alter ego corporation) cannot effectively guaranty
the debt of the partnership (or alter ego corporation), since this
would in effect be a guaranty of one's own obligation, a conceptual
non sequitur. Indeed, this is how the case is commonly interpreted in
practice. 0 7
It is ironic that Valinda Builders, the only case preceding Spangler that directly held waiver of 580b impermissible, presented the
very situation that gave Professor Hetland such concern in Hetland
II, i.e., seller subordination to a developer buyer's construction loan.
Because the court disallowed the buyer's waiver of 580b, the risk of
loss on the subordinated note in Valinda Builders was returned to
the sellers in spite of contractual agreement by the buyer to assume
that risk. The Supreme Court in Spangler silently followed the same
poorly reasoned path of Valinda Builders by failing to give effect to
the buyer's express waiver of 580b and thereby forced itself to create
a whole body of fiction to arrive at the same result as if the waiver
had been enforced. If, as the Spangler court's term "variation" suggests, it is doubtful that the Legislature intended to include a development subordination transaction within the ambit of 580b in the
first place, then there appears to be no reason to regard an express
contractual waiver of 580b in such transactions as contrary to public
policy.
In 1988 the Russell decision was criticized and expressly not followed in the case of Palm v. Schilling.'0 8 In Palm, a contractual
waiver of 580b in a refinancing agreement subsequent to the sale
transaction was expressly declared void as contrary to public policy.
106. See supra note 101 for discussion of Riddle and Union Bank.
107. See Joint Committee of the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of
California and the.Real Property Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association,
Legal Opinions in California Real Estate Transactions,45 Bus. LAW., 1139, 1176-77
(1987).
108. Palm v. Schilling, 199 Cal. App. 3d 63, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988).
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Thus, Palm stands squarely for the proposition espoused by Hetland
and others that 580b cannot be waived by contract. It must therefore
be examined closely since it is directly contrary to the thesis of this
article.
The Palms sold their home to defendants for $725,000 in 1980.
(Even in inflated California one must assume it was a substantial
property for that price in 1980.) The price was paid as $210,050 in
cash, with the balance in the form of two promissory notes secured
by second and third deeds of trust on the property due in three
months and two years, respectively. The court found that the buyers
intended to pay the short-term note largely through the sale of their
previous home. In the lexicon of Spangler one might wonder whether
this sort of risky swing ("creative") financing would be considered
"standard" or a "variation." Whether standard or varietal, the transaction did not come off as planned. The defendants' previous home
did not sell, and they were unable to pay the three-month note when
it came due. Attempts to sell or refinance both properties were unsuccessful until mid-1981 when defendants secured a twelve-month
loan from a third party to repay the overdue three-month note to the
sellers. The sellers agreed to subordinate their remaining note to the
new loan in exchange for a retroactive increase in the interest rate.
A year later, when the third-party second loan was due, the defendants again asked the sellers to subordinate their remaining loan
to another loan from a new lender. The sellers agreed to do so only if
the buyers paid a $25,000 principal reduction on the note and agreed
to waive their 580b antideficiency protection. Buyers accepted these
conditions and obtained the new loan.
This further refinancing left three deeds of trust on the property
with the seller holding the third. Prior to the due date of the third,
one of the senior trust deed holders foreclosed. The reported decision
of the case does not state whether the foreclosure resulted from interest payment defaults or failure to pay a balloon principal amount
when due.
Faced with these facts the trial court followed Russell, found the
580b waiver valid, and granted judgment to the plaintiff sellers in
their suit on the note.
The court of appeal reversed. The court explicitly disagreed with
Russell to hold a waiver of 580b invalid regardless of the fact that it
is bargained for in a transaction subsequent to the creation of the

purchase-money obligation. 09
Interestingly, the Palm court began its discussion of the waiver
issue by saying that the "Supreme Court has held the provisions of
section 580b may not be contractually waived by the debtor in advance" and cited Freedland as the precedent for this point. 110 As
noted above,"' however, Freedland did not present an issue under
580b, and in Spangler, when the Supreme Court had an express contractual waiver of 580b standing naked before the bar, the court
looked the other way but reached a result consistent with enforcing a
waiver. Thus, for the Palm court to state the Supreme Court has
held 580b "may not be contractually waived" was stretching a point,
to say the least.
Beyond overstating, or misstating, the Supreme Court's actions regarding contractual waiver of 580b, the Palm court's analysis of the
issue is confusing and contradictory in several respects. On the one
hand, the court apparently interprets Spangler, Roseleaf, and Spangler's line of developer subordination cases as decisions in which a
"creditor is not recognized as a purchase money obligee,"" 2 and
"the court[s in those cases] refused to recognize the purchase money
nature of the original transaction."" 3 On the other hand, the court
quoted the California Supreme Court's statement in Brown that
"[w]ith purchase-money trust deeds, [] the character of the transaction must necessarily be determined at the time the trust deed is
executed. Its nature is then fixed for all time. . . .114 In Spangler
and several of its progeny, 1 5 the original secured note was clearly a
purchase-money note and was only subordinated long after the closing (and a period of default) in a newly bargained agreement. It is
highly discordant to theorize on one hand that the character of the
transaction is fixed for all time at the time of the original transaction, but on the other hand that a purchase-money note is to be considered something other than a purchase-money note because of a
bargained subordination later.
The court in Palm made a curious argument about the effect of
109. Id. at 67, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 603. The conflict in the court of appeal between
Palm and Russell has yet to be resolved.
110. Palm, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 67, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
111. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
112. Palm, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
113. Id. at 71, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 605 (emphasis added). This view is not supported
by either the facts or the language of the decisions of Spangler,Roseleaf, et al.In those
cases the courts clearly viewed the notes as purchase-money obligations avoiding application of 580b not because they were not purchase-money debts, but because the transactions were considered "variations" on the "standard" purchase-money note transaction.
114. Palm, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 76, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (first two alterations in
original).
115. See, e.g., Roffinella v. Sherinian, 179 Cal. App. 3d 230, 224 Cal. Rptr. 502
(1986); Ziegler v. Barnes, 200 Cal. App. 3d 224, 246 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1988).
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section 2953 of the Civil Code as well. Adopted in 1937 (four years

after passage of 580b), section 2953 provides,
Any express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at the time of
or in connection with the making of or renewing of any loan secured by a
deed of trust, mortgage or other instrument creating a lien on real property,
whereby the borrower agrees to waive the rights, or privileges conferred
upon him by Sections 2924, 2924b, 2924c of the Civil Code or by Sections
580a 1or16 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be void and of no
effect.

Plaintiffs argued that failure of section 2953 of the Civil Code to

include 580b in its proscription against waiver supports the notion
that 580b may be waived, at least subsequent to the original loan
transaction. The court responded,
We do not read Civil Code section 2953 to support the Palms' claim that
section 580b may be waived subsequently by contract. Section 580b predated Civil Code Section 2953, yet it is not mentioned in the later-enacted
provision. One may presume the Legislature was aware of Section 580b but
intended to exclude it from the aegis of Section 2953. But the reason is not
that the Legislature intended to permit subsequent waivers of section 580b,
section
but that it was unnecessary to include that section within Civil Code
2953 because, by its own terms, section 580b was not waivable.1"

This is a startling statement. "By its own terms" 580b says nothing about waiver, either with respect to the time of the original

transaction or a later time; 580b merely states a rule. Similarly, the
other sections that are referred to in section 2953 of the Civil Code

"by their own terms" are silent about waiver. If it was not "necessary" to include 580b within section 2953, why was it "necessary" to
include the other code sections in order to demonstrate a legislative
intent to bar waiver when all of the provisions are equally silent regarding the possibility of waiver? The court's discussion on this point
makes no sense. The plain words of the code sections involved show
that the legislature said the borrower protection rules of sections

2924, 2924b, and 2924c of the Civil Code and sections 580a and 726
of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be waived; but knowing of

the rule of 580b, the legislature did not say that rule cannot be
waived. The logical inference that waiver is not prohibited is
compelling. 118
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2953 (West 1974 & Supp. 1993).
117. Palm, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 75-76, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
118. The court's evident hostility to the idea of waiver of 580b, as reflected in its
illogical approach to interpretation of section 2953 of the Civil Code, presents a curious
contrast to its statement that: "[p]erhaps in recognition of the prohibition against deficiency judgments, or perhaps because of the potential unfairness to junior lienholders
powerless to prevent the destruction of their security by a senior secured creditor, the

116.

Since the Palm court's statement that the Supreme Court has held
580b cannot be waived is not supported by stare decisis, and its interpretation of section 2953 is illogical, what is the basis for the
court's decision that a negotiated waiver of 580b for consideration
long after the sale transaction is void? It would appear the decision
boils down to an attempt to protect the buyer from hardship. Referring to Salter's language about the necessity of borrowers and ruinous concessions, the court observed, "Ruinous concessions are, if
anything, easier to obtain when the debtor is in default. Then the
temptation to 'press the bet' is likely to be stronger than the poor
decision to purchase the property in the first instance."'1 1
Certainly there is surface appeal to the notion of protecting the
debtor in a hard place; this after all is the basic rule of 580b. But
sympathy for the buyer whose patently risky financing plans crumbled does not supply a compelling logical basis for holding a subsequently bargained waiver of 580b absolutely void. The Palm case
presented two parties in a perfectly ordinary transaction; the
purchase and sale of a home. There is nothing to suggest that either
party was unaware of the potential financial consequences of their
agreement (except perhaps that one was unaware of the surprise the
court had in store). Under the circumstances it could be said the
plaintiff sellers were equally forced by necessity (of threat of foreclosure by the senior creditor) to make the "ruinous concession" of
again subordinating to new senior debt rather than foreclosing themselves when the defendants had failed to perform their contract.
What would or could the parties have done had the seller not
agreed to subordinate when the first of the third-party second loans
came due? The sellers could have attempted to cure defaults on the
first and second while foreclosing their third, thus reinvesting in a
sold property and placing themselves at further financial risk while
accelerating the buyer's loss of equity. Alternatively, if the sellers
refused to subordinate, perhaps the buyer could have obtained a
much larger new second loan (at presumably greater cost) to pay off
both the second and the seller's third, and losing the protection of
580b in the process. Considering the positions of the parties faced
with these difficult, risky, and uncertain alternatives, with both of
them under the guns of secured creditors holding the higher ground,
an appeal to public policy simply does not provide a clear-cut basis
for a court-made rule that flatly voids a bargained contractual
waiver of rights by one party in exchange for valuable concessions
from the other.
Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of purchase-money mortgages." Palm, 199 Cal.
App. 3d at 69, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
119. Id. at 73, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (quoting Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263,
267, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943)).
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In short, while Palm does directly hold contractual waiver of 580b
to be void as contrary to public policy, it does not offer stare decisis,
statutory, logical, or any other persuasive support for its conclusion,
and it is in conflict with the Russell decision from an equal-level
appellate court. Palm should not stand in the way of enhancing
transactional predictability by permitting freedom of contract with
respect to waiver of 580b.
A buyer is no more likely to be pressured by necessity into accepting a seller's demand for 580b waiver in negotiation of the
purchase and sale than he or she will be pressured by necessity into
meeting the seller's price or any other term of the deal. In Spangler
and the other cases reviewed in this article, buyers negotiated with
sellers for the seller's agreement to subordinate the purchase-money
deed of trust to a construction loan. The desire to obtain subordination of the seller's lien as part of a consensual, transaction can hardly
be characterized as "necessity" justifying a public policy based limitation on the parties' ability to allocate risk by waivers and other
contractual agreements as they see fit.
The Real Property Law Section and the Business Law Section of
the State Bar of California recently published a proposed statute for
comprehensive reform of California's real property foreclosure
laws. 120 This proposed statute would replace the whole panoply of
sections 726, 580a, 580b, 580c, 580d, and other sections of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Regarding deficiency judgment rules, the approach of the proposed statute is somewhat different in particulars,
but consistent in philosophy, with the thesis of this article. The proposed new set of laws would combine a clear statutory rule with freedom of contract to achieve transactional predictability. The proposed
statute, insofar as it relates to the subject of this article, states three
basic rules:
1. No deficiency judgments are permitted on any debt secured in whole or

in part by the debtor's personal residence whether purchase money or other

120. See Joint Committee on Anti-Deficiency Laws of the Real Property Law Section and the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California, Proposed Statute
Reforming the CaliforniaReal PropertyForeclosureLaws, 10 CAL. REAL PROP. J. (Special Supp. 1992) [hereinafter Proposed Statute]. This, of course, is not the first time
major reform has been proposed of the depression-era legislation regarding foreclosure
and deficiency judgments. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Mertens, California'sForeclosure Statutes: Some Proposalsfor Reform, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 533 (1986). Professor Mertens was critical of Spangler, but in the context of her larger purpose of overviewing
reform generally of §§ 580a, 580b, 580d, and 726, she only briefly discussed its unrealistic attempt to apply the prevention of overvaluation "purpose" of 580b. Id. at 548-50.

debts").
(defined in the proposed statute as "protected
22

21

2. Rule number 1 may not be waived."
3.

Debt secured by real property other than the debtor's personal resi-

dence may be recourse or nonrecourse as the parties agree by contract, regardless of the nature of the debt (purchase money or otherwise), and
regardless of whether foreclosure is by judicial or nonjudicial procedures

(thus making 580d subject to contractual waiver as well as in other than

homeowner transactions)."13

We can expect' lively debate to ensue over the breadth of protection offered to homeowners under the "protected debt" concept of
the proposed statute (as well as other provisions). However, the tortured history of 580b in business and development transactions
shows the need for greater freedom of contract (including negotiation of terms and conditions of recourse) in subordinated purchasemoney deeds of trust under existing law. It follows that the drafters
of the proposed new foreclosure statute are on the right track in
their proposal to enlarge the permissible scope of freedom of contract as a means of simplifying and clarifying the law in real estate
finance transactions.

121.
122.
123.

Proposed Statute §§ 1.140, 1.160, 1.165 & 3.100-.300.
Id. § 2.1260.
Id. § 2.700.

